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NOMINAL INCOME TARGETING WITH THE MONETARY BASE AS INSTRUMENT: 
AN EVALUATION OF MCCALLUM'S RULE 1 
Gregory D. Hess. David H. Small and Flint Brayton 2 
Traditional long-run objectives for monetary policy are low 
inflation and stable growth of real output at full employment. 
Nominal income targeting has been proposed as a policy that would 
strike a reasonable balance between these two goals. Long-run 
inflation would be restrained by low, stable nominal income growth. 
and real growth on average would not be affected by the conduct of 
monetary policy. In the short-run, such a policy would split 
temporary supply shocks into price and output effects. and pursuing 
a nominal income target would prevent these shocks from hav ing any 
long-term effect on inflation. Shocks to the aggregate demand side 
of the economy. from any source, would be offset by such a policy. 
Indeed, Bennett McCallum has set forth an operational 
proposal for nominal income targeting. 3 Seeking to base his 
policy rule on a v a riable that the Federal Reserve can "control 
directly and/or accurately. " McCallum selects the monetary base as 
the policy instrument . 4 His rule adjusts base growth for 
1 . With "Estimates of Foreign Holdings of U.S . Currency--An 
Approach Based on Relative Cross-Country Seasonal Variations" by 
Richard D. Porte r . 
2 . The authors a r e. respectively: Economist . Monetary 
Studies; Section Chief, Monetary Studies; and Section Chief . 
Macroeconomic and Quantitative Studies. at the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System. We would like to thank Richard Porter. 
Brian Madigan, and George Moore for their comments and Ellen Dykes for 
editorial assistance. We also gratefully acknowledge the research 
assistance of Allen Sebrell, Ron Goettler. and Chris Geczy. 
3 . "Monetarist Rules in Light of Recent Experience," American 
Economic Review Proceedings. vol . 74 (1984). pp . 388-91; "Robustness 
Properties of a Rule for Monetary Policy." Carne~ie-Rocbest er 
.Conference Series on Public Policy. val. 29. (Autumn 1988) PP · 1? 3- " 
204; and "Targets. Indicators. and Instrum:mts of Monetar~ Polley· 
Monetary Policy for a Changing Financial Enylronmeni. (Washlngton. 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. 1990). pp . 44 - 70 : 
4. McCallum adopts the following terminology. An lnstru~ent 
variable is one that can be directly controlled. a goal varlable is 
the ultimate argument of the monetary authorit~'s preferen7es. a 
~arget is an operational guideline for proceedlng ~rom one s . 
:nstruments to one's goals. and indicators are ~arlables that provlde 
lnformation to the Federal Reserve but are not lnstruments. targets. 
nor goals . 
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changes in trend velocity and for deviations of nominal GNP from its 
targeted path. 
In this paper, we explore McCallum's monetary base instrument 
rule in the context of several models. The first section uses two 
models, previously utilized by McCallum, to demonstrate the 
general properties of his rule and to update through 1992 the 
empirical support for the rule. The second section uses models that 
allow a significant role for interest rates in transmitting the 
effects of changes in the monetary base to aggregate demand. The 
analysis in these two sections makes two main points: (1) Shifts. 
or instabilities, in the structural relationship between the base 
and nominal GNP in the 1980s and 1990s raise questions about the 
efficacy of the proposed rule; and (2) The ability of McCallum's 
base instrument rule to control nominal output depends on the 
response pattern of the target variable, nominal output, to changes 
in the base. In the sequence of models presented, we lay out these 
dynamic linkages in successively more detail and examine their 
· implications for nominal income targeting. 
RE-EXAMINING MCCALLUM'S RESULTS5 
McCallum's rule for using the monetary base as an instrument to 
target nominal GNP is 
(1) Llbt a - (1 /N) 
N 
1: 
j=1 
where: b 
- log of the St. Louis monetary base 
of nominal GNP X - log 
v - log of the GNP velocity of the monetary base. x - b. 
x* -target value of x (grows at 3 percent per year) 
Ll - first difference operator. 
The coefficient a is chosen such that, absent influences from the 
other terms, the base grows at 3 percent per year (the assumed 
· the rule growth rate of potential real output) . The second term ln 
. 1 · ty of the 
adjusts base growth for recent trends ln the GNP ve ocl 
ble to those 5. To make results in this section directly compara b se 
presented by McCallum, we use the measure of the m~neta~yus! GNP as a 
constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. L~UlS an witch to GOP-
measure of aggregate output. In the second sectlon we s 
: ..•. 
~ 
... 
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monetary base. In computing trend velocity. McCallum sets the 
length of averaging to sixteen quarters (N = 16). For example, if 
base velocity had been growing on average by 2 percent over the 
previous four years. growth of the base would be reduced by this 
amount to keep nominal GNP growing at 3 percent on average . 
Historical trends in base velocity that this "velocity adjustment" 
term would be expected to offset are shown in the upper and middle 
panels of chart 1. The final term of the rule adjusts base growth 
in response to deviations of nominal GNP from its targeted level; 
McCallum typically gives A a value of 0.25. 
In his evaluation of this policy rule. McCallum maintains the 
hypothesis that the economics profession lacks agreement on the 
appropriate theoretical and statistical paradigms with which to 
explain macroeconomic fluctuations. Consequently. he analyzes the 
base-instrument rule within a range of models. He simulates each 
model--with the base rule incorporated--subject to estimated 
historical shocks. The simulations are performed as 
"counterfactuals''-- that is, given the estimated empirical 
relationships among the variables of interest. what would have been 
the paths for these variables had the Federal Reserve followed 
McCallum's base instrument rule. 
A Single-Equation Model of the Economy 
"To display its general properties. we first examine McCallum's rule 
in conjunction with a single-equation model of nominal income that 
relates contemporaneous nominal GNP growth to its lagged value and 
the growth of the monetary base. McCallum used this model, and we 
have attempted to replicate his results over the period 1954:Q1 to 
1985:Q4 (see column i of table 1). Estimates for the extended time 
period 1954:Q1 to 1992:Ql are reported in equation 2 and in column 
ii of table 1: 
(2) 
-2 R 
Llxt 
.188 
.008 + 
(3.93) 
.341 Llxt-1 
(4 . 70) 
Durbin-h -1.45 
+ .306 Llbt 
(2.55) 
SEE .0098 
Sample period 1954:Q1 to 1992:Ql 
-3-
+ J.l.t. 
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where SEE is the standard error of the estimate and (as throughout 
the paper) heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
paLentheses . 6 This model, in conjunction with the base rule, 
produces a root-mean-squared deviation (RMSD) of simulated nominal 
GNP from the targeted values of 0.0243 for the period from 1954:Q1 
to 1992:Q1. This RMSD represents an increase from the value of 
0.0197 reported by McCallum when the model is estimated and 
simulated through 1985: Q4. ?· The top panel of chart 2 displays the 
targeted and simulated values of nominal GNP. 
More detailed observations on the model performance are 
evident in the middle panel of chart 2 which shows growth rates of 
the simulated values of nominal GNP and the monetary base, while the 
bottom panel shows the nominal GNP shocks that are fed into the 
simulation. Three observations are noteworthy. First, the short-
run swings in simulated nominal GNP (dotted line , middle panel) 
closely follow the historical GNP shocks fed into the model (dotted 
line. lower panel) . Accordingly. the quarterly standard deviations 
of simulated and actual nominal GNP growth are fairly close at 4.24 
percent and 4.42 percent respectively. 8 Second, medium-term 
swings in nominal GNP growth are damped. For example, the standard 
deviation of the fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter growth of nominal 
GNP for the years 1955-91 was 3.55 historically and is reduced to 
'2 . 38 in the simulations. And third. the mean growth of simulated 
nominal GNP over the full sample is 2.91 percent per annum when 
using McCallum's rul·e. compared with 7. 3 0 percent growth of nominal 
GNP observed since 1954. 
The particular episodes in which the base rule smooths 
nominal GNP can be seen by looking first at the two-year moving 
av erage of the errors in the bottom panel of chart 2 (solid line) . 
At first, the moving average crosses zero frequently. Subsequently. 
however, it tends to be positive from 1975 to 1982 and negative on 
balance from 1982 to 1992. Over the first period, the growth in 
6 . In this paper we use NIPA data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis' recent 1987-base benchmark. To date. these series go back 
to 1959:Q1 . We extrapolate prior to this date using growth rates from 
the Bureau's 1982-base benchmark. 
7 . Using currently published data, we obtain an RMSD of 0 . 0196 when 
we attempt to duplicate McCallum's results (see column i of table 1) · 
8. This lack of quarter-to-quarter improvement results from the 
monetary base responding to deviations of nominal GNP from target with 
a one-quarter lag . 
-4-
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simulated base tends to slow (middle panel) and, as a result, the 
growth of simulated nominal GNP tends to stay centered around 3 
percent despite the positive shocks on average. During the later 
period, however, nominal GNP growth is kept around 3 percent as the 
negative shocks to nominal GNP are offset by an increase in 
simulated base growth. 
To show how the mon~tary base would have moved under the rule 
as compared with actual base supply, in chart 3 we compare the 
simulated growth of the monetary base with its historical pattern 
(the mean has been subtracted from each series). McCallum's rule 
keeps the growth of the base roughly constant through the early 
1970s. in contrast to the historical experience of accelerating base 
growth . Then, from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. simulated 
base growth falls as the economy is subject to positive aggregate 
demand shocks. In the early 1980's simulated base growth increases 
as the trend in velocity growth slows. Of particular interest is 
1990-91, when actual base growth spiked during the recession. A 
rule that simply targeted the base would have led to a tightening of 
policy to keep base growth on target, but Mc ·-: llum's rule calls for 
an accele r ation in the growth of the monetar j· base; an acceleration 
which tends on average to be greater than which was actually 
observed. 
Chart 4 further illustrates this aspect of McCallum ' s rule 
which calls for sharp responses of the monetary base to changes in 
economic perfo r mance. Here we decompose the growth in t he base 
called for by McCallum's rule into the sum of the contributions from 
the constant 3 percent (not shown) . the component due to GNP 
targeting . and the component due to shifts in long-run velocity. 
The component due to GNP targeting (the solid line) fluctuates 
around zero, reflecting the divergences of simulated from targeted 
nominal GNP. As can be seen, the divergence from zero has been 
more pronounced in the past ten years than it was in earlier years--
reflecting less success by the rule in attaining the GNP target . 
Furthermore, the short-run swings in base growth (dot/dash line) are 
driven largely by GNP targeting. whereas the broad swings in the 
base are driven by changes in velocity growth. In particular, the 
velocity effect has been relatively stable over the past two years, 
-5-
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but the response to the movement of nominal GNP below target has 
caused nearly all of the acceleration in the simulated base. 
A Model of Aggregate Demand and Supply 
McCallum also evaluates his rule in the context of a small macro 
model with an aggregate demand equation and a supply side that 
incorporates sluggish wage and price behavior similar to that of the 
9 MPS model. We present this aggregate demand/aggregate supply 
model (ADAS) to show that (1) as in the analysis with the single -
equation model. performance of the rule deteriorates after 1985 and 
(2) the main source of deterioration lies in the demand side of the 
model--where instabilities in base demand, if they exist. would show 
up. 
The aggregate demand curve is similar to the nominal income 
model above (equation 2) except that GNP and the monetary base are 
specified in real terms and real government expenditures are added 
as an explanatory variable. This real aggregate demand equation 
(see also column ii of the aggregate demand panel of table 2) 
estimated 
- 2 R 
where 
g 
y 
p 
through 1992:Ql, is 
.004 + .320 ~Yt-l 
(3.51) (3.75) 
+ .294 (~bt-l - ~pt- 1) 
(2.73) 
.208 Durbin-h = 
+ . 025 (~bt - ~pt) 
(0.20) 
+ .17 5 ~gt - .151 ~gt-1 
(3.52) (-2.98) 
-1 . 03 SEE .0086 
Sample period = 1954:Ql to 1992:Ql 
+ eyt' 
-
the log of aggregate real government expenditures. 
-
the log of real GNP 
-
the log of the implicit GNP deflator . 
. MPS d 1 see Eileen 9. For a description of the Federal Reserves moe terly 
Mauskopf and Flint Brayton. "Structure and Uses of the MPS ~~a~in. 
Econometric Model of the United States." Federal Reserve Bu : f "The 
val. 73 (1987). pp . 93-109; and Flint Brayton and Eileen M~usuo~ 
Federal Reserve Board MPS Quarterly Econometric Model of t e · · 
Economy." Economic Modelling (July 19 85) . pp. 17 0-2 9 2 · 
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The aggregate supply side of the model has equations for 
nominal wages and prices. The wage equation relates the growth in 
nominal wages to changes in expected inflation and deviations of 
real GNP from potential. Our specification of this equation 
estimated through 1992:Q1 is 
(4) 
where 
-2 R 
. 001 + 
(2.91) 
. 551 
. 23Q (yt 
(5.16) 
- .150 (yt_ 1 - y~_ 1 ) + 1.0/lp~ 
(-3.30) 
Durbin-Watson= 1.59 SEE 
Sample period = 1954:1 to 1992:1 
wt - the log of the nominal wage rate 
f yt - the log of full-employment real GNP 
+ e ' wt 
. 0047 
Llp~ - the expected rate of inflation calculated as the lagged 
eight-quarter moving-average of inflation. 
Our specification of the inflation equation relates inflat ion 
to lagged inflation and the lagged growth in wages estimated through 
1992:Q1 is : 
(5) Llpt = - . 001 + .408 Llwt + . 222 Llpt-1 + . 371 Llpt-2 + e pt 
(-1.31) (7.70) (3.01) (6.71) 
- 2 Durbin-h SEE .0034 R .720 = -1 . 70 = 
Sample period = 1954:Q1 to 1992:Q1 
The results for equations 4 and 5 are also reported in column 
iv of the wage and price panels of table 2. 10 These equations are 
10. Column i presents the results for a non-neutral form of the 
model as presented by McCallum when estimated over the sample period 
1954 : Q1 to 1985:Q4, and these results are extended to 1992:Q1 in 
column ii . Column iii presents the results for the neutral model for 
the sample period 1954:Q1 to 1985:Q4, and these results are extended 
to 1992:Q1 in column iv. 
- 7-
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similar to ones used by McCallum, except that we constrain them to 
yield a long-run aggregate supply function that is neutral with 
respect to inflation; those used by McCallum produce a positively 
sloped long-run aggregate supply curve. 1 1 To the price equation 
used by McCallum, we have added the second lag of ~p. With this 
change in specification, neutrality cannot be statistically 
rejected. 12 The unrestricted sum of the coefficients on wage 
growth and lagged inflatio~ is 0.928. The F-test for the 
restriction that the sum of the price and wage coefficients is unity 
has a statistic of 2.3. The restriction cannot be rejected at the .s 
percent level of significance . A similar test for neutrality in the 
wage equation tests the hypothesis that the coefficient on the 
expected inflation term is unity. That coefficient is freely 
estimated to be 0.876. and an F-test for the restriction of the 
coefficient being unity has an F-statistic of 3.26. Again. the 
restriction cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level of statistical 
significance. In sum. we cannot reject neutrality, and we proceed 
·with the above specification that embodies it. 
In the top panel of chart 5, we plot targeted and simulated 
nominal GNP for this model when estimated and simulated over the 
period 1954:Q1-92:Q1. The RMSD of 0 . 0497 for this period is 155 
percent higher than the value of 0.0195 when the estimation and 
simulation period is 1954:Q1-1985:Q4. 13 The bottom panel of 
11. This observation should not be taken as a criticism of 
McCallum 's specification. To reiterate. McCallum's approach was 
essentially agnostic. He was interested in testing the robustness ~f 
his rule in context of several models. The fact that he used a non 
neutral specification does not imply that he endorsed the 
specification . . 
12. If the second lag of inflation were not included 1n equation 
5, the Durbin-h statistic would be equal to -4.27. . lt 
13. In his comments on this paper. McCallum questions th1s :esuh 
by trying to replicate it and showing a more limited increase ~~ 9~.~4 RMSD than we show when the sample period is extended thorough 1 ~ 
--he shows an increase from .0191 to .0277. He derives this re~uin 
fr om a modified version of his aggregate demand and supply.mo1e· the 
which the aggregate supply curve is constrained to b~ ver~~c~el~~ve 
long run as it is in our model . Based on the follow1ng: McCallum 
our results to be valid. In the aggregate demand equ~t~on. while our 
estimates a value of . 1549 on the contemporaneous reab ase.d real 
estimate of .025 indicates a weaker link be~ween th7 a~7 a~ata base. 
output. We first replicated McCallum's est1mate us 1ng 1 s 
(Footnote continues on next page) 
• 
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chart 5 shows the growth of simulated nominal income and the 
simulated base. The standard deviations of the fourth-quarter to 
fourth-quarter annual growth rate of actual and simulated nominal 
GNP are nearly the same at the values of 3.55 and 3.75 respectively. 
Evidence, presented in table 3, suggests that the underlying 
cause for the deterioration in the model's performance as the sample 
is extended is a weakening of the relation between real GNP and the 
real base--that is, an underlying instability in the aggregate 
demand side of the model. Each column of the table reports. for a 
given estimation range and value of A. a decomposition of the RMSD 
into the effects due to aggregate demand shocks (e ) , aggregate yt 
supply shocks (ewt and ept). and the model's stability under the 
rule. 14 The latter is merely the RMSD that would obtain, starting 
from the particular disequilibrium conditions of 1954 :Q4, when the 
model is not subjected to shocks but is allowed to converge to the 
steady state using McCallum's rule for base growth . 
In column i of table 3 we present the results for 1954:Q1 -
1985:Q4 when A= .25. The aggregate demand shocks alone generate an 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
.but then substituted the 1987-based NIPA measures of real GNP as 
discussed in footnote 6 for his 1982 - based GNP figures . This 
substitution causes the estimated coefficient on the contemporaneous 
base to fall from . 1549 to . 0488. To measure the empirical i mportance 
of this difference in the estimates. we increased the coefficient on 
the real base in our model to .1549, while leaving all other 
parameters unchanged. In simulating this version of our model 
thorough 1991:Q4, the RMSD fell to . 024, which is in line with the 
value of . 0277 reported by McCallum in his comments. It appears. 
therefore, that differences between the 1982-based and 1987-based GNP 
figures. and in the resulting estimates of the coefficient on the real 
base in the aggregate demand equation. explains most of the difference 
between McCallum's and our simulation results. 
For our non-neutral specification. the RMSD is 0.0193 for 1954:Q1 
to 1985:Q4 and increases to 0.0321 for the estimation and simulation 
range 1954:Q1 - 1992:Q1. However, there are two peculiar features 
about this system. First. the level of simulated real GNP lies 
uniformly below actual real GNP through the simulation period 1954:Q1 
- 1992:Q1. Second. the divergence between actual and simulated real 
wages widens because of the non -neutrality of the wage equation. 
14. Since the RMSD is the mean of squared terms. and is therefore 
nonlinear. the decomposition will not necessarily sum to its total. 
Also. the various shocks may be correlated with one another. The 
decomposition was achieved by alternatively zeroing out demand and 
supply shocks . 
-0-
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RMSD of 0 . 0200 compared with one of only 0. 0058 for the aggregate 
supply shocks. This difference is. in part. due to the errors that 
are being fed into the aggregate demand equation having a standard 
error of 0. 0089 . whereas those for the wage and price equations are 
considerably smaller--0.0048 and 0.0036, respectively. But 
s till , the sum of the coefficients on the real base in the aggregate 
demand equation is relatively high (0 . 5587), and thereby the rule-
induced changes in the base can stabilize aggregate demand and the 
mod el converges to its steady stat e rather quickly, as indicated by 
the no-shock RMSD of 0 . 0046 . 
Column ii of table 3 extends the estimation and simulation 
ranges to 1992:Ql, but keeps A= .25 . As noted above, the RMSD for 
all shocks becomes larger in this case. In part, this increase 
results from the weaker relationship between the real base and real 
GNP : Coefficients relating the real base to real GNP sum to 0.3182 
(the contemporaneous coefficient is near zero) . This is also 
reflected in the rise of the RMSD to 0.0158 when the economy is not 
subjected to shocks . The value of A= . 25 is not as effective in 
restoring the model quickly to equilibrium even in the absence of 
. I 5 
shocks. Again, the model has a much higher RMSD when it is 
confronted with only aggregate demand shocks than when it is 
confronted with only aggregate suppl y shocks. 
The Changing Relation Between the Monetary Base and GNP 
In measuring the performance of the economy, we have followed McCall~ 
in usin g the RMSD of simulated from targeted nominal GNP. But this 
· · 1 h f the entire sample stat1st1c measures on y t e ave rage per ormance over 
period. If the performance over more recent years has deteriorated 
1 · this rule re ative to that of earlier years, then the case for us1ng 
currently or in the future is correspondingly weakened . 
To address this issue, for the estimation and simulation 
. " period 
results reported in charts 6 and 7 we use a "rolling hor1zon 
fixed at fifteen years and we ext end the analysis through 1992: Ql. As 
can be seen in chart 6 for the nominal income model. the RMSDs are 
15. This instability may result from McCallum ' s selection of 19 ~~ ~~1 
as the starting date for his estimation and simulation rangeshor 
the inclusion of the most recent time period, which weakens t e 
relationships between real base growth and real GNP growth ( ~s ns would 
documented below) . However, each of these possible explanatlO le h. s ru . fundamentally affect McCallum's methodology for evaluating 1 
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relatively low and stable until the early 1980s . Also. the 
coefficient l inking the monetary base to nominal GNP is stabl e and 
significant. But this coefficient weakens. and the RMSD grows 
noti ceably as the 1960s are discarded and the 1980s are added to the 
estimation and simulation ranges. Chart 7 presents a similar sto ry 
for the ADAS model. Once more . the coefficient on the contemporaneo us 
real base is significant on~y during the period from the mid - 19 70s 
until the early 1980s. at which point the coefficient on the lagge d 
real base becomes significant. 
Formal tests for a shift in the coefficient on the base a re 
reported in column iii of table 1 for the nominal income model and i n 
column v of the aggregate demand panel of table 2 for the ADAS model. 
We test whether a permanent shift in the relation between bas e growt h 
and GNP growth (nominal or real) has occurred since 1982:Q1. Th is 
date is used because. as Robert Rasche has found. it marks a 
significant break in the growth rate of velocity in estimate s of 
I 6 demand equations for narrow money measures. For both mod e l s . a 
shift seems to have occurred because we can reject at the 1 pe r cent 
level of statistical significance the hypothesis of excluding both an 
intercept shift and a slope coefficient shift for the base in 198 2 :Ql . 
Furthermore. for neither model can we reject the hypothesis that the 
~urn of the coefficients on the base (real or nominal) in the aggre gate 
demand equations (real or nominal) are zero after 1982:Q1. Using Chow 
tests for instability in all the coefficients. however. we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the nominal and real aggregate demand 
functions are structurally unchanged after 1982 : Q1. These result s 
together suggest that. although a Chow test cannot reject that all the 
coefficients of the aggregate demand equations have changed. a mo r e 
specific test focused on the relation between base growth and income 
growth (both real and nominal) finds that a substantial break ha s 
16 . Robert Rasche. "Demand Functions for Measures of U. S. Money and 
Debt," in Peter Hooper and others. eds .. Financial Sectors in Op en 
Economies: Empirical Analysis and Policy Issues. (Board of Governo rs 
of the Federal Reserve System. 1990). In his comments on Rasche's 
piece, McCallum cites work that explains the level of velocity as a 
function of long swings in interest rates rather than of permanent 
shocks to its growth rate. However. because McCallum consider s 
aggregate demand and supply models where interest rates have be en 
substituted out. these velocity dynamics should already be 
incorporated into the analysis if the model being used is the corr ect 
one. 
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occurred since 1982. In fact. the relation is not insignificantly 
different from zero. 
Implications for Policymakers of the Shifting Relation Between the 
Base and GNP 
The Monetary authority's response to economic developments is governed 
in McCallum's rule by two parameters; ( 1) the speed of response to 
deviations of nominal GNP fro m target and (2) the length of the lag 
used in measuring trend ve locity . As we now discuss. the appropriate 
choice of these parameters may change as the relation between the base 
and nominal GDP shifts . With such shifts documented above for the 
last ten years. the best way to implement McCall urn· s general approach 
is less certain . 
The Choice of the Monetary Authority's Response to Deviations of 
Nominal GNP from its Target . In general, the appropriate choice for 
the value of A depends on the strength of the relation between the 
base and GNP, a nd the policymaker may need to change A as estimates of 
this relation change . For example, if the relation between GNP and 
the base weakens, as suggested above. then to achieve a given 
perfo rmance of the economy. as measured by the RMSD. the policy 
response to deviations from target (A) must increase . 17 
Indeed , moving the end of the estimation period for the ADAS 
model from 1985 to 1992 reduces the sum of the estimated base 
coefficients from 0.56 to 0.32, as shown in columns i and ii of table 
3 . To at least partia l ly offset this decline in the link between the 
base and GNP , in col umn iii we increase the value of A to 0.50. The 
value for the RMSD when the model is subjected to all shocks then 
drops to 0.0260- -a value much smaller than the result for A= . 25 ove r 
the full sample (reported in column ii). but still 33 percent larger 
than the result for the original sample considered by McCallum 
(reported in column i) . Also . when the model is subjected to no 
sho c ks, the rate at which the initial disequilibrium disappears is in 
line with McCallum 's original results. 
The Choice of Measuring Trend Velocity Shifts . Also implicit in 
implementing this rule is the choice of lag length in the measurement 
17. An analogy is that . if the medicine is half as strong . the 
economy will need twice as much of it. 
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of velocity shifts. At one extreme, if all shifts in velocity growth 
are white noise. then the length of averaging changes in velocity (N) 
should be quite large to average out the errors and obtain a better 
estimate of long-run velocity growth. At the other extreme, if all 
changes to velocity growth are permanent, for example if velocity 
follows a random walk, then N should be equal to one since the most 
recent observation of velocity is the best predictor of its long-run 
value. 
In chart 8, we plot the RMSD calculated over the 3-year 
intervals ending in the indicated year when the lag length is sixteen 
quarters as suggested by McCallum and when the lag length is four 
quarters . The two panels are for the nominal income and ADAS models 
when estimated over 1954:Q1 - 1992 : Q1 . This rolling horizo n RMSD is 
meant to capture the marginal effect of the rule over specific time 
intervals . As can be seen in both panels, the choice of lag length 
makes a modest net difference from the early 1960s to the late 1970s . 
In both panels of the chart. the sharpest increase and highest 
level of the RMSD when N=16. however. are realized in the years 
immediately following the break in the trend of velocity around 
1982:Q1 that is evident in chart 1 . As we have shown in chart 4 with 
respect to the nominal income model. during this period the velocity 
adjustment in the McCallum rule apparently was not quick enough to 
offset the shift in velocity. This is evident in that a major 
proportion of the increase in simulated base growth is due to GNP 
falling below target. In fact. the adjustment to the new trend of 
velocity is not completed until 1988 (see chart 4). 
ANALYZING MCCALLUM'S RULE WHEN POLICY IS TRANSMITTED THROUGH INTEREST 
RATES 
We now turn to models not utilized by McCallum and in which the 
transmission of monetary policy to the demand for real goods and 
services works solely through interest rates. We thereby test 
McCallum's rule for robustness across alternative demand sides much as 
h d . f. . 18 e tested it against alternative supply-si e spec~ ~cat~ons. 
The analysis is conducted with two models. and the examination 
with each serves distinct purposes . The first model is small-scale 
18. Although in this paper we have used only the MPS-style supply 
side used by McCallum, he also evaluated his rule using real business 
cycle and monetary misperception supply sides. 
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and adds IS and LM equations to wage and price equations simila r to 
those presented above . The model is kept fairly small so that the 
robustness of its performance with respect to key structural fea t 
ures 
can be examined . Of particular importance are those parameters that 
affect the re sponse of short rates to the monetary base and the 
response of long rates to short rates. Alternative specifications of 
these two relations are examined. 
The second model is the large-scale MPS model maintained by t~ 
Board's staff. In this model, McCallum's base instrument rule with 
/... = . 25 leads to instrument instability. After looking at this. we 
examine using interest rates as the instrument to target nominal GNP 
in the MPS model. 
A Small Macro-Model with Interest Rates 
This model consists of a supply side which has wages and prices that 
are sticky in the short run but which is neutral with respect to 
inflation in the long run. On the demand side, the IS curve depends. 
among other variables. on the long real interest rate. These 
equations are presented in appendix 1 because we do not consider 
alternative specifications of them . 
The demand side also contains the estimated base demand curve 
given below in equation 6 where a unitary coefficient is imposed on 
the l o g of nominal GDP. and a velocity trend that shifts in 19 82: Ql is 
"incorporated. Therefore, the equation, in effect. models the 
detrended log of base velocity as a function of the Box-Cox 
transformation of the federal funds rate. (The Box-Cox transformat ion 
is explained below . ) This shift in trend velocity. evident in chart 
1. was previously documented by Rasche. 19 The estimated velocity 
trend b efore 1982 is 2 percent per year and thereafter is - 0 . 4 
percent. At a funds rate of 4 percent, the interest elasticity of 
base demand is 0 .029. 
bt 0 " 19. Rasche, " Demand Functions for Measures of U.S. Money and De 
(6) log(Base ) 
R2 = . 999 
D-W = .306 
Std. Error = . 0171 
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-2.18 + log(GDPN) 
(459) 
-.005 TIME + 
(47 . 9) 
. 027 BoxCox(RFFE) 
(6.25) 
.006 D82T. 
( 21. 4) 
Estimation period = 1960 : Q1 - 1992:Q1 
where: 
Base - St . Louis Reserve Bank monetary base 
GDPN - nominal GDP 
RFFE - federal funds rate (effective yield) 
D82T- Shift in time trend. equals zero before 1982 and equal to one 
in 1982:Q1 and increasing by one per quarter thereafter. 
Three aspects of this equation of special note are (1) ~ts 
specification i n terms of the levels of variables and the absence of 
lags of variables. (2) the s hift in trend. and (3) the use of the 
Box-Cox transfo r mation . First . by modeling the level of velocity as 
depend i ng on only cont emporaneous variables. we assume that the long -
run response of base deman d to a change in income or interest rates 
is completed in one period. This specification is advantageous to 
McCallum's r ule in t hat the large contemporaneous interest elasticity 
helps to stabilize the model in the presence of base demand shocks --
that is. smaller changes in interest rates are needed to re -
equilibrate the supply and demand for the base. 
An adverse effect of this specification for the simulated 
performance of McCallum's rule is that the estimated shocks to bas e 
demand fed into the simulation may be larger than if a more explicit 
dynamic specification were chosen . When such specifications were 
examined, the general results were that over the past ten years. when 
our base demand equation had its largest and most systematic errors . 
the errors from the alternatives were not much different from thos e of 
Hess. Small and Brayton 
h h .f. . 20 I . 1 h t e c osen spec1 1cat1on. n part1cu ar. t e errors from equation 
6 and those from a base demand equation estimated by Rasche are 
c01npared in appendix 2. where we also present changes in U.S . currency 
held abroad as a possible contribution to recent base demand errors . 
Second, by including a shift in the trend of velocity, the 
estimation errors fed into the simulation are reduced. Nonetheless, 
in the simulations. this shift in trend growth of base demand will be 
unexpected and McCallum's rule will try to accommodate it through the 
16-quarter mo ving average of past changes in velocity. 
The third aspect of the base demand equation concerns the 
functional form for interest rates. Two common choices are linear and 
l ogarithmic forms. Choosing the linear form has the disadvantage of 
allowing nominal interest rates to be negative--an outcome that can 
can easily occur in the zero-inflation paths in these simulations. As 
a major focus in simulating this model is the behavior of interest 
rates. this outcome seems unsatisfactory . A logarithmic specification 
avoids the problem. But the log specification can also lead to very 
high nominal rates because that specification calls for proportional 
changes in interest rates as shocks are fed into the simulation. 
In the base demand equation 6. our chosen specification for the 
federal funds rate employs the Box - Cox transformation. 21 This 
functional form ensures that the interest rate remains positive , as 
would the logarithmic specification. but tempers increases in the 
funds rate when it is at a high level. The Box-Cox parameter is set 
at 0 . 2 . 22 
With this base demand equation and with base supply set by 
McCallum's rule. short-term interest rates are determined . Changes in 
short-term interest rates are transmitted to long rates by way of 
equation 7. Short and long rates move together one for one in the 
long run, with an equilibrium spread of the long rate over the short 
20. These dynamic models led to general problems of convergence of 
the simulations. ~ 
21. The Box-Cox transformation of the variable xis BC(x) = (x-
1)/~. for 0 < ~ ~ 1. As ~approaches zero the Box - Cox transformation 
approaches the logarithm . For A equal to one, it is a linear 
transformation. 
1 of 22. Iterating over values of the Box - Cox parameter yields a va ue 
0.34 that minimizes the sum of squared errors in the base demand 
equation. The value of .2 was as close as we could get to this and 
still achieve convergence in the simulations. 
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f 100 b . . 2 3 T rate o asls polnts . o examine the sensltlvity of model 
simulations to the way long-rate dynamics are modeled, two alternative 
response patterns are entertained for short - run behavior. In the 
"quick'' response case the full effect of the funds rate on the bond 
rate is contemporaneous. In the "slow " response case . a change of 100 
basis points in the short rate produces current and subsequent 
quarterly changes in the long rate of 30, 30, 20. and 20 basis points 
respectively . (After analyzing this model, we make it linear in 
interest rates and let the bond rate depend on the one-quarter - ahead 
federal funds rate. The model is then solved assuming perfect 
foresight . ) 
(7) RTB10Yt 
subject to: La. 
l 
1 
A. Quick Res~onse B . Slow Res~onse 
ao 1 ao 
a 1 0 a 1 
a 2 0 a2 
a 3 0 a 3 
where 
RFFE = federal funds rate (effective yield) 
RTB10Y = 10-year Treasury bond rate 
. 3 
. 3 
.2 
'2 
In moving from the nominal bond rate to the real rate that 
affects spending decisions. the expected inflation rate used to 
construct the real long-rate is set to zero in the simulations. This 
is consistent with McCallum's rule which achieves zero long-run 
inflation, even though there are short-run fluctuations in inflation 
associated with the shocks being fed in. This way of handling 
expected inflation in financial markets may be thought of as being 
consistent with a high degree of credibility that the McCallum rule 
will continue to be followed. 
23. The quick adjustment specification given below and estimate~ 
over 1983:Q1 - 1992 : Q1 yields a long-run intercept of 100 . 004 basls 
points. Extending the sample period back throug~ the earl~ 1980s 
would incorporate a period of oil shocks and an lnverted yleld curve--
which presumably is not indicative of steady-state behavior. 
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We examine the robustness of McCallum' s policy rule in t he 
context of this model by analyzing the economy's performance under 
variations in two key structural components--the speed of responses of 
base demand and of the long rate to changes in the funds rate . In all 
c ases. we conduct simulations by first allowing the model to settle 
into a steady state and then feeding in the historical shocks. 24 
The behavior of the endogenous variables therefore abstracts from all 
problems associated with a transition to zero inflation associated 
with implementing the rule . 
First we examine effects of the short-run dynamic response of 
base demand to changes in interest rates by shifting progressively 
mo re of the long-run response of base demand to interest rates from 
the co n temporaneous response to a one-period lagged response that was 
added to the model . The long-run interest rate response is left 
un changed - -as are all other parameters and the estimated shocks that 
are fed into the equation. Also. to provide favorable stability 
conditions. we use the " quick " response of the long rate to the short 
rate. 
When the contemporaneous response of base demand to interest 
rates reaches as low as 60 percent of the long - run response, swings in 
simulated interest rates become highly magnified relative to the case 
of a full contemporaneous response to interest rates. In particular. 
with only base demand shocks being fed into the simulation . the funds 
rate frequently (nine times) exceeds 20 percent in the 1960s. and 
peaks at 27 percent over the 1970s and 1980s and again in the 1990s. 
In contrast. when the long - run effect of changes in interest rates is 
realized c ontemporaneously in the base demand equation. the funds rate 
fluctuates between 1 percent and 7 percent during the 1960s and peaks 
at 10 percent in the 1970s and 1980s and at 17 percent in the 1990s . 
A second check for robustness is to compare the simul ation 
performance under quick and slow adj u stments of the bond rate to the 
federal funds rate . 25 The results of the simulations are presented 
in charts 9 .A- 9.G . Each chart except the last shows the behavior of 
24 . Because the model has long lags. its dynamics are affected by 
the historical values of variables just before the simulation . These 
dynamics, which are specific to that period, are purged from the it 
results by putting the model into a steady state before subjecting 
to shocks. 
25. The base demand equation has its full interest response 
contemporaneously as in equation (6). 
a 
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the economy when it is subjected to a particular type of shock; in the 
last chart, all shocks en~er the simulations. Each panel of a char~ 
shows the behavior of a given variable when the model has either the 
• 
quick ( solid line) or the slow (dotted line) adjustment of the bond 
rate to the funds rate. 
From these char~s one can see that the abili~y of the base rule 
to control nominal GDP gro~h is affected by the response speeds of 
long rates to short rates. If the long rate responds slowly to short 
rates. the resulting interest rate variability will be well in excess 
of historical experience--for example, the funds rate approaches 60 
percent at one point in the 1990s. While the lags in the slow 
response were chosen to accentuate the control problem, what is of 
interest is the sensitivity of model performance to the way the long 
rate is modeled . The effect on economic performance is most 
pronounced for base shocks, but it is also present for IS and wage and 
price shocks. That volatility feeds through to. and is augmented by 
volatility in other variables. in particular nominal GDP growth. 
The RMSDs from these simulations are not directly comparable to 
those of the models presented earlier because in these simulations the 
errors for the IS curve exist only since 1980:Q4 and the simulations 
start in 1960:Q1 rather than in 1954:Q1. But to give a sense of the 
way in which the simulations compare, the RMSD with the quick 
adjus~men~ is 0.025, which is similar to the RMSDs of the earlier 
models in which the base directly affects aggregate demand. The RMSD 
increases to .043 wi~h the slow adjusting bond rate. 
We carry ~his analysis one step further by allowing the long 
rate to depend on future short rates. 26 The model is respecified ~o 
be linear in interest rates and then is reestimated. Three 
specifications of the long-rate equation are examined : (1) weights of 
0 . 5 on both the contemporaneous and first lagged values of the funds 
rate; (2) a weight of unity on the contemporaneous funds rate ; and (3) 
weights of 0.5 on both the contemporaneous rate and a one-quarter lead 
26. To solve the model we use the methodology developed by Gary 
Anderson and George Moore in "A Linear Algebraic Procedure for Solving 
Linear Perfect Foresight Models," Economics Letters. vol. 17 ~pp. 247 -
52.) For a brief overview of this methodology see the append~x to 
"Inflation Persistence" by Jeff Fuhrer and George Moore. which was 
prepared for this conference. 
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27 
of the funds rate. An IS curve shock is used to illustrate the 
implications of a forward-looking long rate for the ability of the 
model and McCallum's rule to to stabilize the economy . 28 The 
behavior of interest rates and nominal and real GDP (deviations fr~ 
steady-state values) are presented in charts lO.A and lO.B 
respectively. In both charts. the left- hand panels compare responses 
when the long rate reacts with a lag and when it reacts fully 
contemporaneously . The right-hand panels again show the case of a 
full contemporaneous response but compare it with the specification 
inco rp orat ing the forward-looking long rate . 
Th e genera l conclusion from charts lO.A and lO.B is that the 
forward-looking rate provides a little additional smoothing of 
29 
economic performance . The response of that long rate to the IS 
shock is sharpest in the case of a full contemporaneous link between 
the long and short rates (chart lO . A, lower panels). With a lag in 
the bond rate equation. the response is delayed. The peak response of 
the forward-looking long rate occurs contemporaneous with the shock; 
but by incorporating the future de c line in the funds rate, the 
response is not so large as in the case of the full contemporaneous 
response of the long rate. The paths of nominal and real GDP growth 
in the alternative cases generally reflect the movements of the long 
rate : Both are smoothed the most with forward-looking rates because of 
less - pronounced overshooting of GDP growth. 
The dependence of economic performance--shown in Charts 9 and 
10- -on t he manner in which long rates are modeled can be seen as 
either strengthening or weakening the case for the McCallum rule. The 
adverse implication is that if in practice rates behave in a sluggish 
manner the n excessive variability. if not instrument instability. may 
27 . Because the slow response of the long rate to changes in the 
sho rt rate -- as specified in equation 7--is just barely stable. we do 
not use it . 
28. The IS c urve is given a one-period shock of 1 percent at an 
annual rate to the growth of real aggregate demand . Because that 
equation--A-l in appendix l--is an error-correction specification .. 
there is no long- run effect on the level of demand stemming from thlS 
growth rate shock. 
29 . Additional smoothing owing to a forward-looking component in the 
long rate would be apparent if shocks in the model were positively 
autoco rrelated. In response to a shock. the perfect-foresight 
solution technique used here would extrapolate the shock into_th~ 
future and cause the long rate to rise in anticipation of pol1cy s 
continuing to offs et the shock. 
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well emerge. Furthermore. such sluggish behavior of long rates can be 
interpreted as indirectly incorporating into the model long lags in 
the response of spending to changes in interest rates. 
A positive interpretation of these results for implementing the 
McCallum rule also applies to any specific rule for conducting 
monetary policy. The rule gives the markets a firmer basis on which 
to interpret changes in the federal funds and with which to form 
expectations of future Federal Reserve moves. Long rates could be 
expected to move quickly in response to those shocks Lhat call for 
persistent moves by the Fe~eral Reserve and such responses would 
augment these policy moves. While these results suggest that the 
range of interest rate fluctuations would be moderated by this 
response of long rates. the potential for volatility induced by the 
rule would still depend importantly on the strength and patterns of 
the intertemporal responses of base and spending demands to changes in 
interest rates. 
Analysis Based on the MPS Model. 
Although differing considerably in size. the MPS mod el and the 
model analyzed in the previous section are similar in one critical 
respect: The transmission of monetary actions to the rest of the 
economy occurs through interest rates rather than through direct 
effects of monetary quantities. An issue addressed in this section is 
~he choice of the policy instrument--the monetary base or the federal 
funds rate--and how this choice is influenced by the nature of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. In general terms, the degree of 
control over a target variable achieved by an instrument depends on 
the types and magnitudes of shocks that may intervene to affect the 
realization of the target variable. given the instrument ' s selected 
value. 30 As discussed in the previous section. if the base is the 
policy instrument and monetary transmission is through interest rates. 
shocks to base demand affect the realized value of nominal output. 
Nominal output is insulated from this type of shock. however. if the 
30. We assume that. even in the case of one target and one 
instrument, the instrument cannot be varied to offset the influence of 
all shocks on the target. 
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policy instrument is the federal funds rate. 31 
The first subsection below briefly describes the structure of 
the MPS model . The second subsection presents a test of two 
alternative views of the ways in which monetary actions are 
transmitted to real output . One view is labeled IR (interest rate ) 
and is represented by the spending block of the MPS model; the other 
is the DM (direct money) view as specified in equation 3. The latter 
expresses real GNP growth as a function of lagged GNP growth, and 
current and lagged values of growth of the real base and real 
government purchases . Evidence providing some support for theIR vi~ 
is reported. The final subsections present simulations of the MPS 
model under alternative policy rules. Compared with McCallum's 
proposal, the results favor the use of the funds rate as the policy 
inst rument, rather than the base, while considerable support is found 
for nominal output as a policy target. 
The MPS model. The MPS model, which contains roughly 125 estimated 
equations, 200 identities. and 200 exogenous variables, has been used 
at the Federal Reserve Board over the past twenty years for 
forecasting and analyzing alternative economic scenarios. The 
structure of the model is such that . in the long run, when markets 
clear and expectations are fulfilled, money is neutral and output is 
'determined by aggregate supply. Short-run properties , however, are 
quite different : Aggregate demand largely determines the level of 
output , and the utilization rates of labor and capital may be either 
below or above their long-run equilibrium values; wages and prices 
adjust slowly; fiscal poli cy affects real output directly through the 
contribution of government spending to aggregate demand and less 
directly through the effect of tax policy on disposable income and 
investment incentives; changes in the supply of money affect nominal 
interest rates and. because inflation expectations are autoregressive. 
real interest rates. too. There are no direct effects of monetary 
31 . However, a base-instrument policy may be more effective at 
tempering the effects of aggregate demand shocks in the short run. 
because of the response of int erest rates necessary to equilibrate 
base demand and supply. Another issue relevant to the choice of 
policy instrument is the temporal response of the target to a change 
in the instrument. Excessive instrument variability may arise if the 
response pattern grows in magnitude for a period of time, unless the 
policy rule is carefully designed. 
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quantities on real spending or prices. 32 Rather, changes in money 
move interest rates. which in turn affect spending directly as well as 
indirectly through the value of wealth and the exchange rate. 33 
Also important to the analysis presented below is the 
specification of the demand for the monetary base in the MPS model. 
especially the time profile of the interest elasticity of the demand 
for the base . For these ex~rcises, the base is assumed to equal the 
currency component of M1 plus a required reserve ratio times deposits 
currently subject to reserve requirements- -demand and other checkable 
deposits. 34 The structural equations for currency, demand deposi ts. 
and other checkable deposits each have estimated contemporaneous 
interest rate elasticities that are quite low, both in absolute size 
and in relation to the estimated long-run interest elasticities. 35 
As illustrated earlier, the magnitude of the contemporaneous interest 
rate elasticity of base demand greatly affects how well a policy rule 
that uses the base as an instrument (or as a target. for that matter) 
performs if the transmission channel is through interest rates. 
Finally. the temporal dynamic structure of the MPS model is 
much more complex than that of any of the other models examined he re 
or by McCallum. Thus. analysis with the MPS model also provides a 
te~t of the robustness of McCallum's rule to the degree of dynami c 
complexity in economic models. In the models that McCallum examines. 
variables are expressed as growth rates and. as is typical for these 
types of models. the dynamic structure is rather simple. The MPS 
model , however , is specified in levels. This approach tends to find 
32. Although wealth is a determinant of spending in the model. its 
influence cannot be interpreted as a real balance effect. A change in 
the monetary base, absent any accompanying fiscal action that alters 
the stock of government debt, affects the composition of wealth but 
not its magnitude. 
33. See note 9 for references to the MPS model. In addition. the 
model's monetary transmission mechanism is examined ~n Eileen 
Mauskopf, "The Transmission Channels of Monetary Pol1cy: How Have 
They Changed?" Federal Reserve Bulletin. vol . 76 (December. 1990). PP· 
985-1008 . 
34. For simplicity, we exclude vault cash and excess reserves from 
the measure of the base used. 
35. The three equations are revised versions of those reported in 
Moore, Porter, and Small, "Modelling the Disaggregated Demands for M2 
and M1: The U.S. Experience in the 1980s." in Pe~er Hoope~ ~nd 
others. editors. Financial Sectors in Open Econom1es: Emp1r1cal 
Analysis and Policy Issues (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 1990 ) , pp. 21-105. 
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significant dynamic adjustments and interactions at medium and low 
frequencies. besides those aL high frequencies. 
A Test of the Monetary Transmission Channel . Because of the 
importance of the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism to the 
choice of policy instrument. regression tests using the non-nested J 
test are conducted to comp are the IR and DM specifications. 36 The 
teSL regression employed has the form 
where f!..y is real GNP growth. Xdm is the set of regressors from the Dl1 
/1. 
equation 3, and f!..y is predicted real GNP growth from the demand 
mps 37 
block of the MPS model . U (a vector) and a (a scalar) are 
coefficients to be esLimated. In this form. the equation is a 
specificaLion Lest of the DM model against the IR alternative . An 
estimate of a that is not significantly different from zero would be 
evidence that the particular representation of DM is not misspecified : 
an estimate significantly different from zero would indicate 
misspeci fication . Although carrying out the corresponding 
specification test with the IR view as the null hypothesis would be 
desir able. it would be quite involved. because the demand block of the 
MPS model is a large set of equations. 
Estimates of the test regression are shown in table 4 for the 
pe r iod 1970:Q1 - 1989:Q4, the longest in-sample span over which the full 
36 . Davidson and MacKinnon, "Several Tests for Model Specification 
in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses." Econometrica. vol. 49 
(1981). pp. 781-94 . 
37. The latter is a time series of one-step-ahead forecasts of real 
GNP growth from the demand block of the MPS model . The demand block 
includes spending sectors (such as consumption and investment): 
income , employment and tax equations; and the financial sector (term 
structure and asset valuation equations). It excludes wage. price. 
and monetary sectors. Exogenous variables (aside from seasonal 
factors and fiscal parameters. whose values change only infrequently) 
are treated as stochastic with values projected using simple time 
series equation s . The one-step-ahead simulations take the value of 
the fede ral funds rate as known. This assumption could reduce the 
varianc~ of the forecasting errors if. historically. the funds r~te ed 
were adJUSted to offset contemporaneous shocks. Given small est~mat 
values of contemporaneous interest elasticities in the model's 
spending equations . however. problems associated with endogeneity of 
interest rates cannot be substantial in one-step-ahead forecasts . 
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set of MPS equations can be simulated. The first column shows t he 
estimates of the DM equation (that is, a = 0) . Coefficient values are 
similar to those estimated over other sample periods, shown above in 
table 2. The J test regression, column ii, estimates a to be 
significantly greater than zero--the point estimate is 0.60 and the t-
statistic is 5.5. Moreover, the base growth coefficients in the 
regression are jointly insignificant. At a minimum, these results 
suggest that the IR demand specification in the MPS model provides an 
alternative to the simple DM equation that cannot be rejected. 38 
The Federal Funds Rate Versus the Base as Policy Instruments: An 
Illustrative Simulation. To illustrate the properties of the MPS 
model under alternative policy instruments, while keeping nominal 
output as the policy target, we conduct two simulations involving a 
transitory downward shock of $25 billion to real federal government 
purchases. One simulation incorporates McCallum's proposed base-
instrument rule, but omits the velocity adjustment term because the 
design of the simulation precludes any permanent shifts to velocity. 
The other uses the federal funds rate as the policy instrument. In 
each case, the MPS model is adjusted so that it tracks historical 
values in the absence of shocks. and thus the target for nominal GDP 
. t 1 . h' . 1 h 39 lS se equa to lts ~storlca pat . 
In the case of McCallum's rule, instability is quickly 
apparent, and the model solves for only five quarters . The path for 
the federal funds rate is (deviations from historical values. in 
percentage points): -0.53. -1.06, 4.24, -6 . 71, and 126 .4 0. This 
instability. we believe, stems from the temporal pattern of the 
interest elasticity of base demand in the MPS model. described above . 
38. Problems with bias and serial correlation of errors are found in 
the one-step-ahead forecasts of the MPS demand block. however. 
Although not directly relevant to the present analysis, earlier work 
indicated that there might be a small omitted direct channel from 
money (M2) to wages and prices in the MPS model. See Albert Ando. 
Flint Brayton, and Arthur Kennickell, "Reappraisal of the Phillips 
Curve and Direct Effects of Money Supply on Inflation," in Lawrence R. 
Klein, ed .. Comparative Performance of U.S. Econometric Models (Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp. 201-26. 
39. The simulation runs from 1985:Q1 to 1991:Q4. The magnitude of 
the government purchases shock is equal to 0 . 6 percent of the baseline 
value of real GDP in the quarter in which the shock is introduced 
(1985 :Q2). 
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we conjecture tha t al t ering the adjustment parameter (~) in the 1. 
. . . . Po 1cy 
rule would be unlikely t o alter s~gn~f~cantly the s~mulation results. 
we have not a t tempted to see if modifications to either the rule or 
the mode l would achiev e a s t able resu l t. 
The same shock to gov ernment spending is well controlled by a 
pol i cy th a t tar get s the level and growth rate of nominal GDP but uses 
the f ederal funds rate as the instrument . (The next section describes 
t h e s peci fie form of the n.{le. ) The time profiles of the funds rate, 
nominal GDP . and its real and price components are plotted in chart 
11. Th e fund s rate fal l s initia l ly as both the level and growth of 
n ominal GDP are below baseline. Subsequently. the growth component of 
the t ar get turns positive. and pushes the funds rate above baseline 
f o r a short period . All significant deviations of the instrument and 
t a r get are completed within a year or so. although small oscillations 
in e ach persist for several years . 
Alternative Policy Targets . Although his research has focused on 
·n ominal GDP as the target of policy. McCallum has also reported some 
t e sts of price level targeting. 40 In this final section. we use 
s tochastic simulations of the MPS model to evaluate the two targets he 
4 I ha s e xamin e d -- nominal output and the price level--as well as M2. 
Be c aus e of the evidence of instability of base- instrument policies i n 
the MPS model. the simulations take the federal funds rate as the 
'po li cy instrument . 
The stochastic simulation procedure used involves the repeated 
simulation of the model with ran doml y drawn additive shocks applied in 
eac h qua rte r t o all estimated equations and more than 100 exogenous 
variables. Each policy analy zed is subjected to a sample of 180 
t wen t y-qua r ter simulations, each differing by only the particular 
val u es of the random quarterly shocks that are applied . The shocks 
40. McCallum, "Targets. Indicators. and Instruments of Monetary 
Pol i cy. " 
41. In this analysis. nominal output. the price level and the MZ h 
money s tock ar e int ermed i a te policy targets. As discussed below. t e 
ulti~a~e o~ jectives. or goals, of policy are assumed to be d to 
s tab~l~ z at ~on o f t h e p rice level and real output. Metrics emplo~e 
compare d i ff e re nt poli cies are measures of variability of the prlce 
level a nd r eal output . 
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are based on actual historical errors. 42 
For each poli·cy. the federal funds rate. r. is adj us ted in 
response to movements of the level and the four-quarter growth rate of 
43 the target. t. : J. 
1\ 1\ 
rt a1ti.t + a 2(ti.t- ti.t-4). 
Value s of the instrument and targets are measured as deviations from a 
deterministic baseline simulation. The '"' denotes that current -
quarter values of targets may be estimates. depend i ng on the 
information lag assumed for each target. For nominal GDP and the GDP 
deflator. the information lag is assumed to be one-half quarter and. 
1\ 
in these instances, t . is measured as the average of values in the J.,t 
cur rent and immediately preceding quarters. M2 is assumed to be known 
contemporaneously. For each target, we use a coarse grid search to 
find the values of the feedback coefficients that minimize a simple 
policy loss function, constructed as the unweighted average of the 
variances of the levels of real GDP and the GDP deflator (relat ive to 
values in the deterministic baseline) .44 
Table 5 presents a summary of stochastic simulation results. 
To compare the ways alternative targets would perform over an extended 
period, we take the reported standard deviations from t he fifth. and 
last. year of the stochastic simulations. Irrespective of whether 
·targets are compared on the basis of standard dev i ations of real GDP. 
42. The simulation procedure used by McCallum. and employed 
elsewhere in this paper, can be interpreted as one long stochastic 
simulation in which errors are drawn in their historical sequence. 
Other analyses of monetary policy rules using the MPS model and the 
stochastic simulation procedures described in this section are 
reported in Flint Brayton, William Kan . Peter Tinsley and, Peter von 
zur Muehlen. "Modeling and Policy Use of Auction Price Expectations. " 
in Ralph Bryant and others, Evaluatin~ Pol icy Re~imes: New Resear ch 
in Empirical Macroeconomics (The Brookings Institution, forthcomin g). 
and in Flint Brayton and Peter Tinsley. "Interest Rate Feedback Rules 
of Price Level Targeting." unpublished manuscript . Board of Gov7rnors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Research and StatistJ.cs. 
October. 3, 1991. The material in this section draws heavily on the 
latter reference. 
43. The addition of the growth rate term was found to significantly 
improve the performance of the policies studied. . 
44. For the M2 and price level policies. however. the grJ.d search 
yi elded a sort of corner solution: If the policy feedba ck 
coefficients were increased beyond those reported. a substantial 
number of simulations failed to converge. 
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the GDP deflator or nominal GDP . the ranking of targets places . 
4 5 nom1na 
GDP first, M2 second , and price level last. For the nominal GDp 
and M2 policies , the policy rule appears to be stable: The profile 
across the simulation interval of standard deviations (not sho~) 
appears to level off in the fifth year. For the price target poli cy, 
standard deviations over the simulation horizon tend to increase by 
ever larger amounts, indica.ting that the policy is probably unstable. 
The dominant performance of the nominal GDP target is 
relatively straightforward to explain. Nominal GDP has two advama~s 
over an M2 target: First. it is more closely related to the assumed 
ultimate goals of policy--stability of the price level and of real 
output; And second. with an interest rate instrument, it is unaffected 
by shocks to money demand. It performs better than a price level 
because it requires the policy instrument to respond to deviations of 
both real output and price from their desired values. If the goal of 
policy is to control both types of deviations, a target that 
incorporates elements of each goal is likely to work better than one 
that does not. Moreover, direct policy responses to offset demand 
shocks help control prices, because output deviations are an important 
determinant of subsequent pri c e movements in the MPS model and demand 
shocks are estimated to be quantitatively more significant than price 
shocks. Thus. the nominal GDP target provides better control over the 
'price level than does a policy that targets prices directly. 46 
Besides comparing results of alternative policies with each 
other, we can see how wel l the policies work in relation to measures 
of historical volati lity. As table s shows, only the policy based on 
the nominal GDP target has a standard deviation of the unemployment 
rate that is similar in magnitude to the historical variation in this 
series . This findi ng seems to imply that stationarity of the price 
level could be achieved with no more variability of real activity 
that observed historically . However, the volatility of quarterly 
changes in the funds rate, under the reported nominal GDP target 
policy, is somewhat higher than the historical standard deviation. 
than 
45. The policy ranking also is unaffected if the policy feedback 
paramete:s are varied over a wide range. 
46 . Th1s statement holds only for relatively simple policy rules. 
such as the o~e examined here. A price target policy with a muc;:h . ~ore 
complex dynam1c structure should be able to overcome the instablll Y 
found for the price target ru l e examined here. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
This paper has examined McCal lum's proposed base-instrument rule for 
targeting nominal output in the context of two classes of economic 
models. The first class spe~ifies a direct link between the monetary 
base and spending. In the second, the monetary transmission mechanism 
operates through interest rates. Within each class. several different 
models are examined. The paper reaches three main conclusions: 
1 The relationship between the monetary base and nominal output seems 
to have weakened significantly in the past decade. This weakening 
brings into question the ability of a policy using the monetary base 
as the instrument to control nominal output effectively . In the 
sequence of models examined. the deterioration of the link between the 
base and output is shown to lie mainly within the aggregate demand 
side of the economy. with the base demand equation exhibiting a shift 
in the growth rate of velocity and large errors over the past decad e . 
2 In models in which the transmission mechanism of monetary poli cy is 
through interest rates, the ability of McCallum's' base -instrument 
policy to control nominal output is found to be very sensitive to the 
lag structure of (a) the interest rate sensitivity of base demand and 
(b) the speed with which changes in short-term interest rates are 
transmitted to spending through long rates. In an analysis with a 
small model, the degree of control over nominal output that McCallum ' s 
rule achieves is comparable to that found in the models with a direct 
link between the base and output only if the interest responsiveness 
of base demand is nearly contemporaneous and if the lag between the 
long-term interest rate and the short-term rate is very short. 
Additional tests in which a forward-looking term structure is 
introduced show some further improvement in control. 
3 In experiments with the MPS model, results favor the use of the 
federal funds rate as the policy instrument; the lagged responses in 
the model's structure are such to make McCallum's base -instrument 
policy unstable. With the funds rate instrument, however, 
considerable support is found for using nominal income as a policy 
target, compared with using either M2 or the price level . 
Finally. we note that in his comments appearing next in this 
volume. McCallum indicates that he was unsuccessful in attempting to 
replicate some of our results. With a version of his original ADAS 
model that approximates our ADAS model and with his base -instrument 
rule, McCallum found a less severe deterioration in economic 
performance as the sample period is extended over the last decade. We 
believe our results to be correct, and in footnote 13 have discussed 
them in light of McCallum's comments. 
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1 . McC a llum's Nominal ABBreBate Demand Function 
fuct = a.0 + a.1 •fuct _1 + a.2 •b.bt + a. 3 • DUMM + a.4 • DUMM•b.bt + e -------~------~~---------------r~~--------------~~~Xt --------------~(~iL) ________________ ~(~i~i~) ________________ u( i~i~iL) __ ----_ 
-----
Adj-Rsq. 
SEE 
RMSD 
Durbin's h 
F (a.:3,4 ) 
F(a.:2,4) 
Chow 
Est. Range 
* * * 
. 008 
( . 00 2) 
* * * 
.265 
( . 08 2) 
* •• 
.4 76 
( .1 35) 
.219 
.010 
.020 
-1. 43 
. 74 
1954:1-85:4 
* * * 
. 00 8 
(. 002) 
* * * 
.341 
( . 074) 
••• 
.306 
( .120) 
.188 
.010 
.024 
-1 . 45 
. 67 
1954 :1-92:1 
••• 
.00 7 
(.002) 
••• 
. 2 60 
(.074) 
* •• 
. 540 
(.150) 
. 003 
( .003 ) 
•• 
- . 496 
(.2 31 ) 
. 237 
.009 
. 057 
-1.54 ••• 
11.72 
0.0 3 
1954:1 -92:1 
Adj-Rsq .: Adjusted R-squared. 
*. * *. * * *: Significant at or below the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
level. respectively . 
RMSD : Root Mean Squared Deviation. 
Durbin's h : Test for serial correlation with lagBed dependent variables . 
SEE : Standard error of the estimate. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent. 
DUMM = 1 fro m 1982:Ql to th e end of the sample period. 
CHOW : Tests for a structural break for all coefficients 
F (a.: 3 , 4) is the F-test statistic for the hypothesis that 
F(a.:2,4) is the F-test statistic for the hypothesis that 
0 otherwise. 
in 1982 :1. 
a. = 0. 
a.3 4 - 0 + a. - . 
a.2 4 
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2. McCallum's ADAS Model (continued on next page) 
Aggregate Demand: ~yt= o0 + o 1 ~yt_ 1 + o 2 ~ ( b-p)t + o 3 ~(b-p)t_ 1 + o 4~gt + 5 ~gt_ 1 
+ o6DUMM + o7 DUMM• ~(b-p)t + o8 DUMM•~(b-p)t_ 1 , _yt 
With Non-neutral supply side 
(i) ( ii ) With neutral supply side ( iii ) (iv) (v) 
Adj-Rsq. 
SEE 
••• 
.004 
(.001) 
••• 
. 263 
( . 088) 
. 160 
( .132) 
••• 
. 398 
( .120 ) 
"". 
. 190 
( . 055) 
••• 
-. 180 
(.054) 
.259 
. 009 
-1. 02 Durbin's h 
F(8:6,7,8)) 
F(8:2,3,7,8)) 
CHOW 
.54 
• •• 
. 004 
( . 001 ) 
• •• 
. 320 
( .085 ) 
. 0 25 
( .125 ) 
• • 
.294 
(. 107) 
• • 
.175 
(. 05 0 ) 
.. " 
-.151 
(.051) 
.208 
. 009 
- 1 . 0 3 
.60 
Same as I Same as 
Column (i)a Column (ii)~/ 
RMSD .019 .032 .019 .050 
Est. Range 1954:1-85:4 1954:1-92:1 1954:1-85:4 1954:1-92:1 
.00 .) 
( . 001 ) 
• •• 
.268 
(.083 ) 
• •• 
. 223 
(. 146) 
. .. 
. 408 
( .1 35 ) 
. .. 
. 184 
( .04 9 ) 
. . " 
-. 154 
( . 048) 
- . 001 
( . 001) 
.. 
- . 564 
( . 218) 
- . 0 6 7 
(.2 1 3) 
.25 0 
. 010 
- 1.11 ••• 
3 .76 
. 50 
.60 
.056 
1954:1 - 92:1 
~/ The models of columns iii and iv differ from those of c olumns i and ii 
respectively in terms of their wage and price equations. 
•,••,•••: Significant at or below the 10% , 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
RMSD: Root Mean Squared Deviation for the full model. 
St andard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent. 
DUMM = 1 from 1982:1 to the end of the sample period. = 0 otherwise. 
CHOW: Tests for a structural break for all coefficients in 1982:1 . 
F(8:6,7,8 ) ) : F-test statistic for HO: 8 6 = 8 7 = 88 = 0 . F ( 0: 2,3,7,8)): F-test statistic for HO: 8 2 + 8 3 + 8 7 + 8 8 = 0 . 
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2 . McCallum's ADAS Model (continued ) 
WAGES : t.wt = Po + p1 (yt - y~) + p2 (yt-1 - Y~-1) + ~ 3L\pe + e 
----------~--------~~--~~~~~------~~~----~~-------t ~ With Non-neutral supply side With neutral supply~ 
( i ) (i i ) ( iii ) ( iv) ~) 
••• ••• *** ••• 
Adj-Rsq. 
SEE 
D-W 
. 004 
(.001) 
* * * 
.212 
(.047) 
• • • 
- . 141 
( . 04 7) 
• • • 
.827 
( . 06 7 ) 
.542 
.oos 
1. 81 
. 002 
( . 001) 
* •• 
.217 
( . 044) 
• 
-.14 0 
(. 045) 
.876 
( . 067) 
.S49 
.oos 
l. 62 
* •• 
. 002 
(.00 1) 
• •• 
.231 
( . 04 6 ) 
• * • 
-.lSS 
(.0 46 ) 
1. 0 
. 544 
.oos 
1.72 
.001 
(.0 01) 
* *. 
. 230 
(.041) 
• •• 
-. 15 0 
( .058 ) 
1.0 
.5S1 
.005 
1. s 9 
Same, . 
Column ·~ 
==================================================================================:.:.~ 
y2 
Adj-Rsq . 
SEE 
Dur bin's h 
-.001 
(. 001 ) 
* • * 
. 428 
(.0 55 ) 
•• 
. 180 
( . 081) 
• • • 
. 350 
( . 0 60 ) 
. 728 
. 004 
-1. 70 
.001 
(. 001) 
••• 
.384 
( .050) 
• •• 
.202 
( .077 ) 
• •• 
.342 
( . OS 8) 
. 718 
.0 03 
-1.24 
•• 
- . 001 
(. 001 ) 
• •• 
.446 
( . OS 8) 
• • 
.189 
( .078 ) 
• •• 
. 36S 
( .058 ) 
.731 
.004 
-2. 01 
-. 001 
(. 001) 
•• * 
. 408 
(.OS2) 
•• * 
.222 
(.074) 
••• 
. 371 
( . OS5) 
.720 
.00 3 
-1. 70 
Same 2; 
Column (:· 
----------~1~9~S~4-:~1--------l-9_S_4--:1 _________ 1_9_S_4_:_1 _________ 1 _9S-4--:1~- ----,1~954 : . 
Est. Range 1985:4 1992:1 198S:4 1992:1 1992 :1 
f the ~/ The model o f column v differs from that of column iv in terms 0 
aggregate demand functi on. 
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3. Decomposition of RMSD for the ADAS Model~/ 
( i ) (ii) 
SbQ~k ~ 
All .01 95 .0497 
Agg. Demand .o2oo .0333 
Agg. Supply .0058 .0168 
None .0046 .0158 
Value for /.. .25 .25 
Sum of the est. .5587 .3182 
base coefficients (4.294) (3.063) 
(t- statistic) 
Estimation Range 1954:1-1985:4 1954:1-1992:1 
(iii ) 
.0260 
.0251 
.0099 
. 0061 
. 50 
.3182 
(3.063) 
1954:1-1992:1 
~/Column i uses the model of column iii of table 2; columns ii and 
iii use the model from column iv of table 2. 
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4. Tests of the Monetary Transmission Channel 
~ 0 
~ 1 
~ 2 
~ 3 
~ 4 
~ 5 
a 
Adj . - Rs q. 
SEE 
Durbin Watson 
Durbin's h 
F( ~ :2.3) 
...... 
. 004 
(.001) 
.... 
.209 
(.10 4 ) 
.162 
(.150) 
...... 
.400 
( .155) 
. 147 
( . 115) 
...... 
- . 2 7 8 
(.116) 
. 235 
. 0089 
2.05 
- . 56 ...... 
7.40 
(i) 
.. .... 
. 007 
( . 001) 
.009 
( . 09 5) 
- . 06 9 
(.134) 
.1 85 
(.137) 
...... 
.244 
( . 099) 
.. 
- . 17 4 
( .1 00) 
...... 
. 596 
(.108) 
.452 
.0075 
1 . 91. 
.73 
. 92 
Est:. Range: 1970 : Q1 - 19 89 : Q4 
Standard errors in parent:heses 
Adj.-Rsq: Adjusted R-squared 
F( ~: 2 . 3): F-test statistic for HO: ~ 2 = ~3 = 0 . 
(ii) 
*, * * . * * *: Significant at or below the 10%, 5°/o and 1 °/o level , 
respectively. 
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s. SLochastic Simulation of Alternative Policy Targetsa/ 
Policy feedback 
coeff' s (a1 . a 2 ) 
Information delay 
( quane rs) 
Nominal 
GDP 
(25. 100) 
0 . 5 
S d d d 0 0 ~/ tan ar evlatlons: 
(levels. except as noted) 
real GDP 3.91 
GDP deflator 4.19 
nominal GDP 3.03 
federal funds rate 
quarterly change 
level 4 .06 
unemployment rate 1.47 
M2 4 0 11 
Policy Larget 
M2 
(150 , 300) 
0 
5.08 
5.78 
5.85 
2.34 
3.18 
2.3 3 
2.09 
GDP 
deflator 
(5. SO) 
0 . 5 
7 .11 
10.12 
12.25 
l. 44 
2.49 
3.30 
9.38 
Historical 
SLa~da':d .b./ 
deylatlon 
0.42 1.69 
1 0 57 
a/ Based on 180 20-quarter stochastic simulations. 
Q! Calculated for stationary series only (1960:Q1 - 1992:Q1). 
~/Standard deviations. which are averages of quarterly observations 
ln the fifth year of Lhe simulations, are measured in percent, except 
for the federal funds rate and the unemployment rate. for whi c h t hey 
are measured in percentage point s . 
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f Alternative Policy Ta r gets 5. Stochastic Simulation o 
~_I 
Nominal 
GDP 
Policy feedback (25 . 100 ) 
coeff · s ( o.1 · 0.2 ) 
Information delay 0 . 5 
(quarters) 
. ~/ Standard deviat~ons: 
(levels . except as noted) 
real GDP 3.91 
GDP deflator 4 . 19 
nominal GDP 3.03 
federal funds rate 
quarterly change 
level 4.06 
unemployment rate 1.47 
M2 4 . 11 
Policy target 
M2 
( 150.300 ) 
0 
5.08 
5. 78 
5 . 85 
2.34 
3.18 
2 . 33 
2 . 09 
GDP 
deflat or 
(5 . 50) 
0 . 5 
7 . 11 
10. 12 
12.2 5 
l. 44 
2 . 49 
3.30 
9.38 
a/ Based on 180 20-quarter stochastic simulat:ions . 
Historical 
st:ai!da:d b/ 
dev~ar~on-
0.42 1 . 69 
1 . 57 
Ql Calculated for stationary series only (1960 : Ql - 1992:Q1). 
~/ Standard deviations. which are averages of quarterly observations 
in the fifth year of the simulatioP.s, are measur ed in percent. except 
for the federal funds rate and the unemployment r a te. for which t:hey 
are measured in percentage points. 
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APPENDIX: I 
In the IS curve in the small macro model with interest rates. 
the demand for real GDP adjusts to the lagged value of the gap behlee 
GDP and its long- run equilibrium value. The latter is composed of two 
terms: the first is potential output (QPOT) . canst ructed on the basis 
of trends in output between periods of apparent full utilization of 
resources. 47 A second component is the dependence of long-run 
output on the real rate of interest. The real rate is measured as the 
difference between the 10-year Treasury bond rate and the expected 10-
year- ahead inflation rate as measured by the Hoey survey. Since the 
survey data are available only since 1980:Q3, the estimation is 
started in 1980:Q4 due to the one-period lag with which the real rate 
ente rs the IS curve . Finally. an oil shock variable captures 
uncertainty in relative prices due to oil price changes. This term·-
OILSHK- -depends on the absolute value of changes in the relative price 
of oil and depresses demand whether relative oil prices rise or 
fall. 4 8 (Mnemonics are at the end of the appendix ) 
'(A- 1) ~log(GDP) = .024- .071 [(log(GDP) - log(QPOT )] _
1 (4.49) (1.65) 
R2 = .37 
o-w= 1.41 
- .015 log[RTB10Y - HOEY] 
(4.18) -1 
- . 020 OILSHK _2 (2.03) 
Std. Error= .0675 
Estimation period= 1980: 4 _ 1992 : 1 
- . 023 OILSHK_ 1 (2.61) 
- ~log (QPOT)_ 1 
On the supply side we use a model based on equations (4) and (5) 
in t he text but add supply shocks f in terms of the relative price o 
oil . So while the pri ce equation is unchanged, the wage equation is: 
47. The methodology for . . 
Steven Braun "Est· estlmat1ng potential output was developed by 
r 
b p · lmates of Curr t Q 1 p d ct Y oo1ing Prelimin 1 b en uarterly Gross Nationa ro u Economic Statistic.s_ ary 1 a or Market Data " Journal of Business and ~ ~8. The lagged ch~nv~: 8 · (July, 199 0). pp . 293-304 . ' 
un1tary coefficient--g ln the log of potential output--with the 
Pot . 1 assures that f ent1a output in stead _ ou~put grows as the rate o 
Y state equ1librium. 
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. ) 
(A- 2) Alog (WAGE) .0014 + .25(log (GDP) - log(QPOT) (3 . 60 ) (4 . 98) 
R2 = . 6 2 
o-w = 1. 64 
- .18(log(GDP - log(QP OT)]_ 1 (3.53) - INFLAG 
+ .0039 ~log(RPOIL)_ 1 (1.40) 
+ . 008 ~log(RPOIL)_ 3 (3.49) 
+ .01 Alog(RPOIL) (2.3) - 2 
Std . Error = .0046 
Estimation period : 1960:1 - 1992:1 
Mnemonic s 
GOP real GDP 
HOEY 
INFLAG 
OILSHK 
PUVFL 
p 
QPOT 
RPOIL 
RTBlOY 
WAGE 
Hoey survey expected inflation 
Eight -quarter moving average of inflation as measured by the 
implicit GDP delator . 
Oil shock variable absolute value of Alog(PUVFL/P) where 
average dollar price per imported barrel of oil . 
Implicit GDP deflator 
potential real GDP 
Relative price of oil: PUVFL/P 
10-year Treasury bond rate 
Average hourly earnings in manufacturing 
Small. Hess and Brayton 
APPENDIX II : BASE DEMAND SHOCKS 
In the model with a disa ggregated aggregate semand side of 
Specified the following base demand function the economy. we 
(heteroskedastic it y robust t - statistics in parentheses): 
(1) 0 bt = - 2 .1 8 + 1.0 xt .022 rt . 005 T + . 006 D82T (455. 83) (-6 . 33) (-48.40) (21 . 30) 
Adj-R2 = . 986 D-W = .31 Std. Error 0 0171 
Estimation period = 196 0 : 1 - 1992 :1 
where: 
- log of the St. Louis monetary base 
- log of nominal GDP 
- Box-Cox transformation of t h e federal funds rate 
- Linear time trend 
-Linear time trend beg inning in 19 82 :1 
Since the estimated base demand shocks can contribute 
substantially to the f luctuations i n simulated i nterest rates. the 
residuals f rom this model are compared with those from a base demand 
spec ificati on advocated by Robert Rasche . 4 9 Rasche considers two 
specifications for the demand for the monetary base- -one unrestricted 
and one restricted . In the former. the growth rate of the monetary 
base is regressed on a constant . cont emp oraneous and lagged growth 
rates of real GNP and the contemporaneous and lagged growth rates of a 
short term interest rate . The estimated unrestricted version is : 
ilb - llx 
t t - · 0 0 2 - . 0 0 8 ilR t (-3.25 ) (-1.89) 
- 015 An - . 0 10 ARt_ 2 + . 007 D82 0 Lli\.t - 1 Ll 
(-3.15) ( - 3.08) (6 . 88) 
-.848 ily 
t (-18.85) 
+ .134 !1yt -l + .2 45 !1yt_ 2 - . 537 DINFUt + (2 . 41) (5 . 08) (-5.70) 
R2 = .7 64 D-W 1.10 Std. Error =.0055 
49. See "Ml - Veloci t 
Relationships Exist? ,. . Y and M~ney Demand Functions : Do Stable 
Public Polik~. 27 . i 98 ~~ ;~r~~~~~-Rochester Conference Series on 
-38-
Small, Hess and Brayton 
Estimation period 1953:2 - 1992:1 50 
where: 
- log of nominal GNP 
- log of real GNP 
_Dummy variable equal to zero prior to 1982:1 and one 
thereafter. 
DINFU - A measure of unexpected inflation, constructed as the 
residuals from an ARIMA ( 0. 1,1) model for the inflation rate. 
R - The log of the 3 month Treasury bill rate. 
D82T -Linear time trend beginning in 1982:1 
The restricted specification imposes three constraints. 
First, all the interest rate coefficients are equal. Second, the 
coefficients on lagged real GNP are equal. And third , the sum of the 
coefficients on real GNP sum to zero. Rasche interprets this last 
restriction to mean that the velocity of the monetary base responds 
only to transitory changes in real income. Together these 
restrictions decrease the number of estimated coefficients from to 9 
to 5. 
2 2 
-.006 -.018 L.~ R . t-J ( - 9.86) (-10.33) j=O 
-.719 l~yt - .s .r ~yt _J.J 
(-14 . 84) J=l 
- . 57 4 
( - 4.94) 
DINFUt + . 007 DUM82t 
(6 .1 3) 
3 Std Error = .0061 D-W = 1.1 · 
Estimation period= 1953:2 - 1992:1 
5 I 
The F- statistic for the test of the null hypothesis that the 
b · cted at the 5 restrictions hold is 9. 22. The restrictions can e reJ e 
P Us ing these variables. ercent level of statistical significance. 
50. Excluding the imposition of 
credit 
1980 :1 to 19 80 :3 due to 
controls. 
imposition of credit 51 . Excluding 1980:1 to 19 80 : 3 due to the 
controls. 
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Ras che also found that for this specification the restrictions were 
rejected for the 1953:2-1985:4 and 1953:1-1981:4 estimation periods. 
Chart A-1 plots the residuals from Rasche 's restricted and 
unrestricted specifications. and the change in the residuals fr om the 
base demand function used in the simulations (equation 6). In Tab le 
A-1 we provide some descriptive statistics for these three estimates 
of historical shocks to base demand. both for the full overlap of the 
samples. 1960:1 to 1992:1 (excluding 1980:1-1980:3). and for the sub-
sample 1982 : 1 to 1992:1. 
The table and chart show that the errors from equation (6) 
have a significantly larger variance than those from either of 
Rasche's models. But starting in the early 1980's and continuing 
through the present, the errors from all three models track each other 
clos ely. During the 1990's there appears to be some asso c iati on of 
these errors with estimates of changes in U.S. currency held abroad --
see Chart A- 2. The note by Richard Porter attached at the end of this 
paper briefly describes the construction of this series . 
Resdidual 
Ra sche 
(unrestricted) 
Rasche 
( restricted) 
Simulation 
(c hanges) 
Res didual 
Rasche 
(unrestricted) 
Rasche 
( restricted) 
Simulation 
(changes) 
· Small, Hes s and Br ayton 
Table A-1 
196 0 :1 - 1992 :1 
Correlations 
Rasche Rasche 
(unrestricted) (restricted ) 
1.0 .89 
.89 1.0 
.52 . 57 
1982:1 - 1992:1 
Rasche 
(unrestricted) 
1 . 0 
.92 
. 7 6 
Correlations 
Rasche 
(restrict ed) 
.9 2 
1.0 
.85 
Si mulati on 
(c hanges) 
. 52 
. 57 
1. 0 
Simulation 
(c hanges) 
. 76 
.85 
1. 0 
Varia nce 
2 . 8• e - 3 
3 .8 • e- 3 
8.8 • e- 3 
Variance 
3 . 5• e-3 
4.4 • e-3 
7 . 5• e-3 
-
0 .03 
0 .02 
0 .01 
0 .00 
-0.01 
-0 .02 
Chart ~ - 1 
Residuals from Estimated Demand Functions for the Monetary Base 
(1953 02- 1992 01) 
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Chart A -2 
Preliminory Estimate of Dollar Change in U .S. Currency Held Abroad 
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